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SOUTH KOREA'S NATIONAL SECURITY LAW:




In September 2004, the ruling party in South Korea, along
with two opposition parties, called for the abolishment of the
1948 anti-communist National Security Law. The following
month, Amnesty International, a long-time critic of the law, offi-
cially called for the law's repeal. The law had been enacted in
1948 in response to threats from communist North Korea, but
has long been used by the government to silence legitimate oppo-
sition in South Korea. This Comment will examine South Ko-
rea's National Security Law as viewed by its domestic supporters
and critics, as well as by the international community. Part I will
consider the historical context of the law's enactment. Part II
describes the content of the National Security Law, and Part III
examines the rationale for the law and its enforcement during the
past fifty five years. Part IV examines previous discussions about
the law's repeal; Part V discusses the extent to which the law
violates international human rights norms; Part VI compares
South Korea to two Asian countries with similar laws, and Part
VII considers the prospects for the law's eventual repeal in light
of both domestic and international pressure.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW
The National Security Law was enacted on December 1,
1948,1 just three and a half months after the establishment of the
Republic of Korea.2 Japan's defeat in World War II only a few
J.D., University of Wisconsin, 2006; M.A., Indiana University-Bloomington; and
B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author would like to thank
Elizabeth Moriarty & Mariam Mokri for their contributions to this article, and
her former students at Korea University for first telling her about this law.
E.g., IAN NEARY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN 79-80
(2002).
2 E.g., DONALD STONE MACDONALD, THE KOREANS: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
AND SOCIETY 46 (1990) (Republic of Korea established on August 15, 1948).
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years prior had resulted in the end of almost four decades of Jap-
anese rule in Korea.3 By 1946, political unrest had increased, and
conflicts between right-wing anti-communists and the left-wing
People's Committees erupted throughout the country, especially
in the south.4 Cheju Island, for example, located off the southern
coast of Korea, had a de facto government run largely by the left-
wing People's Committee.' In the ensuing battle by the govern-
ment to suppress this left-wing insurgency, as many as sixty thou-
sand people were killed. Shortly thereafter, in October 1948, a
rebellion in the southern coastal city of Yosu resulted in the
deaths of more than one thousand people Newly elected Presi-
dent Syngman Rhee responded by arresting members of the left.'
To aid the president in suppressing the leftist threat to the gov-
ernment, the National Assembly proposed an anti-treason law,
which it ultimately passed as the National Security Law.9 By
1949, President Rhee had imprisoned thirty thousand people ac-
cused of being communists, and 80 percent of all court cases in-
volved charges against suspected communists. °
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
The stated purpose of the National Security Law is to pre-
vent anti-state acts from threatening the security of South Ko-
rea." "Anti-State groups" are defined in the law as "domestic or
foreign organizations or groups whose intentions are to conduct
' Japan occupied Korea between 1910 and 1945. See, e.g., id. at 39-41, 44-45.
4 BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY 202-24
(1997); see also MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 47.
See CUMINGS, supra note 4, at 217-18.
6 Id. Estimates of the number of people killed range from 15,000 to 60,000. Id. In
addition, almost 40,000 homes were destroyed, as well as more than half the vil-
lages on the island. Id.
Id. at 221-23.
MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 49.
NEARY, supra note 1, at 80. The National Security Law was modeled on Japanese
law intended to suppress Korean dissidents.
'0 CUMINGS, supra note 4, at 223.
n National Security Act, Law No. 3318 (1980), as revised by Law No. 4373 (1991),
art. 1 (S. Korea) [hereinafter National Security Act]; see also Kuk Cho, Tension
Between the National Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea: Security
for What? 15 B.U. Ir'L L.J. 125, 138 (1997) (noting that an anti-State group "was
originally designed to relate to North Korean organizations, but the idea has had
628
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or assist infiltration of the Government or to cause national dis-
turbances. ' 12 The second chapter of the law details specific
crimes and their punishments. Chief instigators or organizers of
anti-state groups are sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
Leaders are sentenced to a minimum of five years in prison and a
maximum of death, and lesser members and those who en-
courage others to join an anti-state group receive a minimum of
two years in prison.13 Further, Article 5 punishes those who vol-
untarily aid anti-state groups, and it prescribes up to seven years
in prison for "accepting valuables from anti-state groups."' 4
Probably the most-criticized section of the National Security
Law is Article 7, which punishes those praising or sympathizing
with an anti-state group. Those who "praise, encourage, dissemi-
nate or cooperate" with an anti-state group will be imprisoned up
to seven years, while anyone who organizes or joins a group that
intends to do any of those acts will receive a minimum of one
year in prison. 5 Those who "create or spread false information
which may disturb national order" will be imprisoned for a mini-
mum of two years. 6 Those who "create, import, duplicate, pos-
sess, transport, disseminate, sell, or acquire documents, arts or
other publications" in order to violate Article 7 will be punished
according to the article violated.17 Finally, under Article 9, those
who "knowingly provide valuables or other monetary benefits or
facilities for hiding, meeting, communicating, and contacting or
provide other conveniences to persons who have committed or
plan to commit" anti-state acts will be sentenced up to ten years
in prison," and under Article 10, anyone who fails to inform on
its application extended to other organizations, including, for instance, Jochon-
gryon, a representative organization of pro-North Korean residents in Japan,
home-grown hard-line anti-regime political organizations in South Korea like Sa-
nomaeng, the Korean Socialist Workers' League.").
12 National Security Act, art. 2.
I3 ld. ch. 2.
14 Id. art. 5(2).
15 Id. art. 7(1), (3).
16 Id. art. 7(4).
I d. art. 7(5).
'8 Id. art. 9(2).
630 Wisconsin International Law Journal
those who have committed anti-state acts can receive up to five
years in prison. 9
III. RATIONALE FOR AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
The rationale for the National Security Law has always been
the threat of subversion from North Korea.2' Indeed, North Ko-
rea's surprise invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950 would
seem to justify the need for a security law, if not the law's effec-
tiveness. Even after the Korean War, North Korea has continued
to send operatives into South Korea.2'
The North Koreans have launched thousands of infiltration
operations against the south since 1953.... Highly trained
North Korean special warfare troops continue armed infil-
trations into the south; some of these are detected and
many probably are not. Such operations are aimed at dis-
turbing authority and public order, planting long-term
agents for subversion and espionage, and promoting
22uprisings.
In 1968, for example, North Korean agents tried to assassi-
nate South Korean President Park Chung Hee.23 Later the same
year, 120 North Korean agents were discovered after landing on
the eastern coast of South Korea.24 In 1983, North Korean agents
tried to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in
19 Id. art. 10. Punishments under Articles 9 and 10 may be "reduced or waived in
cases involving family members." Id. art. 9(2), art. 10. The National Security Law
consists of a total of 25 Articles plus an Epilogue. Chapter 3 addresses "Special
Prosecutions" including the arrest and detention of witnesses (Article 18) and
appeals (Article 20); Chapter 4 addresses "Rewards and Merits." Id. chs. 3, 4.
The National Security Law has been revised numerous times since 1948; the ver-
sion described here is the most recent enactment. Its core purpose and structure
have remained unchanged.
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Burma, and in 1987 North Korean agents blew up a Korean air-
liner, reportedly to convince people not to attend the Olympic
Games in Seoul.'
Nonetheless, critics of the law have long charged the govern-
ment with using it to silence legitimate political and social oppo-
sition.26 Indeed, since enacting the law in 1948 the government
has used it many times to arrest individuals, for acts ranging from
praising North Korea in casual conversation to running as an op-
position candidate in presidential elections.27 In the first year of
its enactment, the National Security Law was used to arrest or
imprison 188,621 people," including thirteen members of the Na-
tional Assembly accused of "disturbing the tranquility of the na-
tion. '' 29 Almost a decade later, opposition Social Democrat
presidential candidate Cho Bong Ahm was sentenced to death
and executed the following year?0 Afterwards, his Progressive
Party "disbanded."'"
In 1961, Major General Park Chung Hee took control of the
South Korean government in a military coup.32 During the first
few years of his regime, he dissolved the legislature and sus-
pended the constitution.33 He used the North Korean threat as a
reason to arrest and torture political dissidents, including future
South Korean presidents Kim Dae Jung and Kim Yong Sam, us-
ing the National Security Law as authority.' Kim Dae Jung, the
25 Id.
2 E.g., NEARY, supra note 1, at 82.
27 Id.; CUMINGS, supra note 4, at 216-17, 368; cf. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 57.
2' NEARY, supra note 1, at 80.
29 CUMINGS, supra note 4, at 216-17.
30 NEARY, supra note 1, at 82.
31 Cho, supra note 11, at 132.
32 MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 53.
31 Id. at 54.
Uichol Kim, Analysis of Democracy and Human Rights in Cultural Context: Psy-
chological and Comparative Perspectives, in 1 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RiGrrs,
AND PEACE IN KOREA: PSYCHOLOGICAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 53, 83-84 (Henriette Sinding Aasen et al. eds., 2001); see also MACDONALD,
supra note 2, at 54-55 (noting that despite Park's repressive tendencies, a new
Constitution with greater civil rights guarantees was adopted in 1963, Park was
elected President, and reelected in 1967). When I asked students at Korea Uni-
versity what they thought of President Park, many defended him for improving
Vol 24, No. 2
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opposition leader during the 1971 presidential election, was ab-
ducted in Tokyo in 1973, brought back to Korea, and impris-
oned.35 The popular poet Kim Chi Ha was jailed in the 1970s for
writing poems that advocated "class division."36 In 1976, an op-
position group wrote a declaration to commemorate the anniver-
sary of a 1919 independence uprising, and under the National
Security Law, those who signed the declaration were sent to
prison.37
Repression under the National Security Law continued in
the 1980s, when General Chun Doo Hwan took power in another
military coup in 1980 and declared martial law in response to stu-
dent demonstrations.3" Kim Dae Jung was sentenced to death for
instigating a large uprising in Kwangju in 1980, although he was
not executed.3 9 General Chun also cracked down on the press,
removing 937 editors and journalists from their posts and putting
newspapers and radio and television stations under government
control.' The Kwangju uprising prompted domestic and foreign
criticism of Chun's repressive policies.41 As a result, a new con-
stitution was adopted and political parties were again allowed to
form.42 However, the government continued to employ the Na-
tional Security Law to punish anyone suspected of North Korean
sympathies. In 1987, the president of a publishing company was
arrested for publishing "travel essays written by Koreans living in
the United States who were reportedly sympathetic to North
Korea."43
the economy, arguing that he was a good President in spite of the repression that
occurred during his administration.
3 See MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 57.
CUMINGS, supra note 4, at 368.
31 See MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 57.
3 Kim, supra note 34, at 84.
3 Id. at 84-85; see also NEARY, supra note 1, at 82. Two other Presidential candi-
dates, Suh Min-ho and Kim Chul, were also charged with crimes under the Na-
tional Security Law. Id.
40 Kim, supra note 34, at 84.
41 See MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 59.
42 id.
4' AsIA WATCH ET AL., FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 31
(1988).
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Later that year, Roh Tae Woo succeeded Chun Doo Hwan
as president.' Workers and students continued to demonstrate,
and "the use of North Korean propaganda themes by some of
them and their attempts to establish contact with the north
caused renewed efforts at control by police and security forces."45
During this time, five Yonsei University students were convicted
under the National Security Law for allegedly meeting to study
North Korean ideology, two Korea University students were
charged with producing publications favorable to North Korea,
and another university student was charged with producing leaf-
lets allegedly based on North Korean radio broadcasts.' In 1989,
President Roh arrested an average of 3.3 dissidents per day
under the National Security Law.
47
During the early 1990s, many pro-democracy, pro-reunifica-
tion, and anti-government movements became active, challeng-
ing the legitimacy of the National Security Law.' However,
following the economic crisis of 1997-98, the National Security
Law was used against students and workers who demonstrated
against unemployment, resulting in more than four hundred ar-
rests in the first half of 1998.41 In general, throughout its fifty-six
years of existence, critics argue, the National Security Law has
been used to arrest "many hundreds" of writers, artists, academ-
ics, publishers, and bookstore owners.5" It has even been used to
arrest and convict ordinary people for casual comments made
while intoxicated.51
The National Security Law continues to be used in the
twenty-first century. In 2001, an American citizen, Song Hak
Sam, was arrested in Seoul and imprisoned for two months after
he supported the publisher of a best-selling book, Kim Jong II's
E.g., Kim, supra note 34, at 84-85.
45 MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 59.
4 ASIA WATCH ET AL., supra note 43, at 32.
41 CUMINGS, supra note 4, at 390.
4 See Cho, supra note 11, at 135.
49 NEARY, supra note 1, at 82.
'o See id.
"' Id. (quoting WON SOON PARK, THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (1993)).
Vol. 24, No. 2
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Unification Strategy.52 Later that year, seven members of a South
Korean peace delegation to North Korea were threatened with
arrest for violating the National Security Law after they attended
ceremonies at a North Korean peace monument in Pyongyang. 3
Also in 2001, Kang Jeong Koo, a sociology professor at Dongguk
University in Seoul, was arrested for violating the National Se-
curity Law after he visited the birth place of North Korean
founder Kim I1 Sung in Pyongyang. 4
The law's reach is limited, however, when alleged violators
are not seen as a threat to South Korean security, especially in
the context of recent openings between North and South Korea.
In one case, a South Korean dissident who had been living in
Germany was arrested when he returned to South Korea after
thirty-six years." Although Song Du Yul had traveled to North
Korea eighteen times and had written letters to Kim Jong II pro-
fessing his loyalty, a Seoul appellate court suspended his three-
year sentence "in light of the growing perception of North Korea
as a dialogue partner."56 Similarly, President Kim Dae Jung dis-
couraged any legal action against the Hyundai Business Group
for secretly giving approximately US$186 million to North Korea
in a blatant violation of the National Security Law.57 This reluc-
tance may be part of a trend toward using the law only when a
52 Congressman Seeks Release of Prisoner, N.Y.L.J., May 3, 2001, at 4 (reporting
that Mr. Song was released and returned to his home in New York after U.S.
Representative Gary Ackerman appealed to South Korea's ambassador to the
U.S. on his behalf); see also Korean-American Returns After Arrest, N.Y.L.J., July
31, 2001, at 6.
'3 Don Kirk, Peace Advocates Charged, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 25, 2001, at A4; see also
Arrest Warrants Sought for 7 S. Korean Visitors to North Korea, ASIA POL. NEWS,
Aug. 27, 2001 (reporting that others were not arrested due to lack of evidence).
54 Chung-Un Cho, Kang Case Rekindles Debate on National Security Law, KOREA
HERALD (Seoul), Oct. 17, 2005, available at http://www.koreaherald.co.kr.
5 Jong-Heon Lee, 1948 S. Korean Security Law Challenged, UNrTED PRESS INT'L,
Sept. 7, 2004; Amnesty Int'l, Open Letter to Acting President Goh Kun - Contin-
ued Use of the Draconian National Security Law: Amnesty International's Con-
cerns about Professor Song Du Yul's Case, AI Index ASA 25/003/2004, Apr. 1,
2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA250032004?
open&of=ENG-KOR.
5 Lee, supra note 55.
57 Kim denied that the money was a bribe to persuade North Korea to participate in
the first inter-Korean summit, saying instead that the money was payment for the
granting of exclusive business rights for seven projects in North Korea. Kim
Apologizes Over Hyundai's Secret Financial Aid to North, ASIAN POL. NEWS,
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legitimate threat exists. In any event, it is almost certainly linked
to the renewed debate over the legitimacy of the National Secur-
ity Law.
IV. DISCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE REVISIONsIREPEAL OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
The National Security Law has been revised seven times
since its enactment in 1948.58 For example, when the 1988 Con-
stitution permitted "much freer political activity," the law was
revised in the wake of discussions to abolish it altogether. 9 In
1993, during the administration of Kim Young Sam, South Ko-
rea's first freely elected civilian president, the law was again re-
vised, this time to deny the National Security Planning Board the
right to investigate alleged violations of the much-criticized Arti-
cle 7.6 However, under the influence of conservatives in govern-
ment, the law was rewritten again three years later, giving the
National Security Planning Board the power to investigate alle-
gations of internal rebellion, foreign invasion, and breaches of
military security.61
When Kim Dae Jung ran for president after having been ar-
rested and sentenced to death under the National Security Law,
his call for the eventual revision of the National Security Law
was no surprise.6" While his administration did not abolish the
law, his Sunshine policy of renewed contact between North and
South Korea did act as a catalyst for increased discussion about
the ultimate purpose and fairness of the law, renewing calls for
its complete repeal.63
Feb. 18, 2003, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is2003_Feb_
18/ai_97790620.
E.g., Yang-Hwan Jung & Min-Hyuk Park, National Human Rights Commission of
Korea Urges Abolition of National Security Law, DONG-A ILBO (Seoul), Aug. 24,
2004, available at http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2004082555158
&pathdir=20040825.
5 NEARY, supra note 1, at 81.
6 id.
61 id.
6 Id. at 82.
6 Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy is a strategy of engagement with North Korea,
rather than confrontation, leading in June 2000 to the first summit meeting be-
tween North and South Korea. E.g., Oh Kongdan, Terrorism Eclipses the Sun-
shine Policy 5 (2002), available at http://asiasociety.erlbaum.net/publications/
Vol. 24, No. 2
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Kim's successor, President Roh Moo Hyun, and the Uri
Party, have openly called for the repeal of the National Security
Law.' In a television interview, Roh asserted that the law had
been used to silence opposition to the government, saying "it
would be better to send [the law] to a museum sealed."'65 Ac-
cordingly, the Uri Party, which holds a plurality of seats in the
South Korean Parliament, along with two smaller parties, an-
nounced in September 2004 that they would submit a bill calling
for the law's abolition.' The Uri Party welcomed Amnesty In-
ternational's public support of this position, and a spokeswoman
for the party expressed the hope that "the opposition party will
take this opportunity to join the global trend of valuing human
rights."67
The main political opponent of the Uri Party's pro-abolition
stance is the Grand National Party.6' The Grand National Party
argues that abolishing the law would compromise national secur-
ity by leaving South Korea defenseless against North Korea,
making it a "haven of North Korean spy agents" if the law is
repealed.69 Their concern, however, extends beyond infiltration
KoreanUpdate2002.pdf; see also NORMAN D. LEVIN & HAN YONG SuP, SUN-
SHINE IN KOREA: THE SOUTH KOREAN DEBATE OVER POLICIES TOWARD
NORTH KOREA 12-15 (2002).
4 E.g., Lee, supra note 55.
65 Jeong Rok Shin, National Security Law Should be Abolished: Roh, CHOSUN ILBO
(Seoul), Sept. 5, 2004, available at http://english.chosun.com/cgi-bin/printNews?id
=200409050029.html.
6 Jin Ryu, 3 Parties to Scrap Security Law, KOREA TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, available
at http://times.hankooki.comlpage/200409/kt2004092322135952820.htm. The Uri
Party initially held a majority of seats in Parliament, but lost its majority in by-
elections "and as a result of convictions for election law violations." U.S. State
Dep't, Bureau of East Asian & Pac. Aff., Background Note: South Korea, http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm.
67 Song Wu Park, Amnesty Backs Security Law Abolition, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 14,
2004, available at http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200410/kt200101416243410
230.htm.
6' E.g., Uri Party Decides to Abolish National Security Law, CHOSUN ILBO, Sept. 7,
2004, available at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200409/20040907
0029.html.
So Young Kim, National Security Law: Repeal or Revision?, KOREA HERALD,
Sept. 9, 2004, available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=
14480. According to intelligence estimates, there are currently up to 40,000
North Korean spies in South Korea. Anthony Faiola, National Security Law Chal-
lenged, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 4, 2004, at 35.
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by spies. Some members of the Grand National Party also attri-
bute South Korea's stability at least in part to the National Secur-
ity Law, and fear that if the law were repealed, South Koreans
would feel free to express their support for North Korea, 0 lead-
ing to political unrest.71 Opponents of the law's abolition also
accuse the Uri Party of conceding to North Korean demands to
repeal the law before the North will consider further contacts be-
tween North and South Koreans.7 2 Members of the Grand Na-
tional Party insist that any change in the National Security Law
must be preceded by a major change in North Korean ideology.73
As one member argued, "It is impossible to scrap or revise the
National Security Law without a basic change in the attitude of
North Korea."74
The opposition's position is strengthened by support from
both the South Korean Constitutional Court and Supreme
Court.75 In 1990, while the Korean Constitution Court recog-
nized that parts of the National Security Law were unconstitu-
tional, it did not hold the National Security Law to be
unconstitutional as a whole.76 In addition, the court found that a
repeal of the entire National Security Law could lead to legal
chaos, and stated that the disadvantages of repealing the law
could be greater than the advantages, given the tensions between
70 Kim, supra note 69. One Grand National Party member predicted that if the
National Security Law were repealed, "people would support and laud North
Korea without any restraint. People who sympathize with North Korean leader
Kim Jong I would be able to act freely." Id.
7, Interview by Kanaha Sabapathy with Song Hae Young, Senior Assistant to the
Uri Party spokesman, Gong Sung Jin, Grand National Party congressman, and
Dr. Chong Young Sun, Deputy Director of the Policy Department of the National
Human Rights Commission of South Korea (ABC Radio Australia broadcast,
Aug. 9, 2004), available at http://www.abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s1194480.
htm. According to Grand National Party Congressman Gong Sung Jin, "The Na-
tional Security Law is the only law to maintain the South Korean liberal democ-
racy status quo. With the general law we cannot maintain the status quo." Id.
7' Cf Lee, supra note 55.
7' Lee Myoung Jin, Ruling, Opposition Parties Fight Over National Security Law,
CHOSUN ILBO, Sept. 6, 2004, available at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/
news/200409/200409060040.html.
74 id.
75 E.g., Lee, supra note 55; Shin, supra note 65; Ryu, supra note 66.
76 Cho, supra note 11, at 136.
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North and South Korea.77 The South Korean Supreme Court
agreed and, in September 2004, ruled against a proposal to repeal
the law.
In response to charges of a potential compromise of South
Korean security, the Uri Party asserts that the criminal law could
be revised to close any dangerous gaps left by the abolition of the
National Security Law.79 Accordingly, in October 2004, the Uri
Party proposed alternative versions of legislation to revise or re-
peal the law, which included proposed revisions in the criminal
law.80
In defense of its pro-abolition position, the Uri Party argues
that the National Security Law will have to be repealed in order
to facilitate exchanges between North and South Koreans."' The
Uri Party admits to the problems posed by the existence of North
Korean laws, such as those that prevent North Koreans from
traveling to South Korea, and particularly the Workers Party
Law, which advocates for a communist South Korea.82 They as-
sert, however, that if North and South Korea are ever to reunite,
communication and exchanges between the citizens of the two
countries are essential.83 The first step in making this possible,
the Uri Party argues, is to abolish the National Security Law.8
4
As one Uri Party spokesperson pointed out, exchanges have al-
ready taken place in spite of the law, including a summit between
7' Id. at 163.
78 Lee, supra note 55; see also Shin, supra note 65 (stating that according to the
Supreme Court, "[p]ossibilities are still left open for North Korea to try to over-
throw our system .... We should be careful in taking a measure that allows the
country to disarm itself.").
79 Lee, supra note 55; Kim, supra note 69.
8o Park, supra note 67; see also Uri Party Decides to Abolish National Security Law,
supra note 68. The Uri Party's assurance that "changes in the Criminal Law will
include punishment for non-organizational, non-violent, voluntary praise for
North Korea" leaves in question the degree to which the abolition of the National
Security Law would actually appease human rights groups that call for greater
freedom of speech in South Korea. Id.
81 Limited exchanges between families from North Korea and South Korea, sepa-
rated since the Korean War, began in 2000. See Stephanie Strom, Koreans, Di-
vided by War, Await Loved Ones' Return, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2000, at 1.
82 Kim, supra note 69; Uri Party Decides to Abolish National Security Law, supra
note 68.
'3 Kim, supra note 69.
8 Id.
638
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Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong I1 in June 2000 as well as several
large exchanges of family members, "so if the law is applied then
former President Kim Dae Jung should be arrested." 5
While the Uri Party has a plurality in the Korean parliament,
public opinion does not seem to support its call for the total re-
peal of the National Security Law. 6 According to a newspaper
poll conducted in September 2004, 66 percent of those polled fa-
vored revision, but not repeal, of the law. 7 In fact, more people
preferred to keep the law in its current form than wanted the law
abolished.' When a "Citizens Rally for Defending the National
Security Law" was held in Seoul in October 2004, police esti-
mated attendance at between one hundred thousand and one
hundred twenty thousand. 9 Groups attending the rally included
the conservative Korea Freedom League, the Christian Council
of Korea, and Korea War Veterans.' One of the arguments pos-
ited for keeping the law was to maintain the country's economic
stability, lest foreign companies opt not to do business in South
Korea.91 Using the National Security Law as a mechanism of sta-
bility appears to be one of the key reasons for its overall popular
support. One editorial queried,
What then would happen if we had completely abolished
the National Security Law? There would be no legal way
to block a South Korean citizen from joining the North's
Workers Party .... Even if one established a juche9 ideol-
ogy research institute ... and instruct[ed] the ideology to
a Interview by Kanaha Sabapathy, supra note 71.
' See Kim, supra note 69; Editorial, Proper Path of National Security Law Debate,
CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), Sept. 7, 2004, available at http://english.chosun.com/
w2ldata/html/news/200409/200409070039.html.
7 Kim, supra note 69.
88Proper Path of National Security Law Debate, supra note 86 (sixteen percent
wanted to keep the law in its current form, fourteen percent wanted the law
abolished).
8 Hyun-Joo Jin, Huge Rally Opposes Anticommunist Law Repeal, KOREA HER-
ALD, Oct. 5, 2004; Yang-Hwan Jung & Se-Jin Jung, About the Citizens Rally for
Defending the National Security Law, DONG-A ILBO, Oct. 4, 2004.
90 Jung & Jung, supra note 89.
", Jin, supra note 89.
Juche (or chuch'e) is commonly translated as "self reliance." It is one of the core
ideas in North Korean nationalism. E.g., CUMINGS, supra note 4, at 402-05.
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students, nobody would be able to block it.... Few citi-
zens believe that our society is fully capable of digesting
such confusions.93
As long as such sentiments predominate among South Koreans,
the Uri Party and its supporters will most likely have a difficult
time abolishing the law.
While the South Korean general public does not support the
abolition of the National Security Law, domestic civic organiza-
tions and human rights groups do. Until recently, however, the
dearth of such groups in South Korea has limited the ability of
opponents of the National Security Law to mount organized
campaigns.94 One domestic civic organization, People's Solidar-
ity for Participatory Democracy, founded in 1994 with the goal of
''promoting justice and human rights in Korean society through
the participation of the people,"95 was one of ten groups to make
a joint declaration urging the abolition of the National Security
Law.' In November 2001, the government established the Na-
tional Human Rights Commission of Korea,97 and in August
2004, the commission for the first time publicly supported the ab-
olition of the law.98 The commission makes three main argu-
ments for abolishing the law: (1) it was established as a
temporary measure and should have been repealed when the
Criminal Law was enacted in 1948; (2) there was no national con-
sensus for any of its seven revisions; and (3) it is a violation of
" Proper Path of National Security Law Debate, supra note 86.
'4 Cf Ah Young Chung, International Rights Activists Urge Repeal of Security Law,
KOREA TiMEs, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://times.hankooki.comlpage/
200409/kt2004091416421653460.htm (stating that only a small number of groups
made declaration).
95 People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, http://eng.peoplepower21.org/
contents/about.html (last visited March 3, 2006).
9 Chung, supra note 94.
9' The Commission was established under the National Human Rights Act (NHRC
Act). The limits of the Commission's investigative powers and the NHRC Act's
"vaguely worded provisions" have been criticized by Amnesty International.
Amnesty Int'l, South Korea: Making the National Human Rights Commission
Autonomous and Effective, Al Index ASA 25/004/2002, Apr. 24, 2002,
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA250042002?open&of=
ENG-KOR.
9 Jung & Park, supra note 58.
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"freedom of thought, conscience, and expressions. .. .", The Na-
tional Human Rights Commission also points out that North Ko-
rea is recognized as an independent country by more than one
hundred nations, and it argues that South Korea needs to ac-
knowledge North Korea's identity as more than just an "anti-
state organization."'" The commission chairman argued that
"Korea has to accept the opinions and decisions of international
society as a member. Its attitude toward North Korea also needs
to reflect the changes in our time and its surroundings."'' 1
V. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
Critics of South Korea's National Security Law argue that it
violates international human rights norms. This section will dis-
cuss some of the major international human rights documents,
and the extent to which they are violated by the National Secur-
ity Law.
A. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1948)
On December 10, 1948, just nine days after South Korea en-
acted the National Security Law, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). 1° Since then, the UDHR has succeeded in "establish-
ing the contours of the contemporary consensus on internation-
ally recognized human rights," and it has been endorsed by
almost all nations.0 3 The UDHR includes among its core struc-
tures that human rights belong to individuals, and that these
rights are to be viewed holistically, as an "indivisible whole"
rather than as a list from which nations may pick and choose."
In addition, each nation has the responsibility of ensuring that its
citizens are accorded these rights. 05
99 Id.
'00 Interview by Kanaha Sabapathy, supra note 71.
101 Jung & Park, supra note 58.
"0 G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810
(Dec. 12, 1948).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 23.
10 Id.
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Among the rights that South Korea is accused of violating
are the rights to liberty, freedom of thought, and opinion; to
peacefully assemble; to be free from arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion; and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a public
trial."°
B. U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT AND
RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS AND ORGANS
OF SOCIETY (1998)
Fifty years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the U.N. General Assembly passed the Decla-
ration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Rec-
ognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("Declara-
tion on Human Rights Defenders"). 7 The declaration calls on
each state to create the social, economic, political, and legal con-
ditions necessary to allow its citizens all the rights and freedoms
'0' Some of the relevant articles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 101, are:
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person." Id. art.
3.
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." Id. art. 5.
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Id. art. 9.
"Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed inno-
cent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has
had all the guarantees necessary for his defence." Id. art. 11, para. 1.
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, fam-
ily, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation.
Everyone has the right to protection of the law against such interference or
attacks." Id. art. 12.
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and relig-
ion .. " Id. art. 18.
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers." Id. art. 19.
"Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association."
Id. art. 20, para. 1.
"Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives." Id. art. 21.
'07 G.A. Res. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144 (Mar. 8, 1999).
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they are due."~ Among those rights is the right "to submit to
governmental bodies and agencies and organizations concerned
with public affairs criticism and proposals for improving their
functioning"'" and the right "to be protected effectively under
national law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful
means, activities and acts.., attributable to States that result in
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.... "110 In
addition, "The State has the responsibility to take legislative, ju-
dicial, administrative, or other appropriate measures to promote
the understanding by all persons under its jurisdiction of their
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.""
1
C. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (1976)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) was entered into force by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1976 and ratified by South Korea in 1990.112 Despite
ratification, human rights organizations accuse South Korea of
violating its provisions for the rights to liberty and freedom of
opinion and expression, as well as the right to be free from arbi-
trary interference into one's privacy.13 South Korea is perhaps
'° Id. arts. 1-2.
109 Id. art. 8, para. 2.
"0o Id. art. 12, para. 3.
.. Id. art. 14.
112 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC.
Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Suk Tae Lee, South Korea: Implementa-
tion and Application of Human Rights Covenants, 14 MICH. J. Iwr'L L. 705, 706
(1993).
"1 Relevant portions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 112, include:
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
are established by law." Id. art. 9, para. 1.
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation." Id. art. 17, para. 1.
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
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justifying its use of the National Security Law on the basis of
Article 4, Section 1, which states:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed,
the States Parties to the present Covenant may take mea-
sures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation, provided that such measures are not in-
consistent with their other obligations under international
law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground
of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin."l 4
D. THE SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES (1984)
The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("Siracusa Principles") were drafted by a group of inter-
national human rights experts in 1984.11 They "set forth the gen-
eral interpretive principles justifying human rights limitations as
well as interpretive principles relating to specific areas such as
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article car-
ries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and
are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals.
Id. art. 19.
.. The Covenant continues:
Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of dero-
gation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present
Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the
reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made,
through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such
derogation.
Id. art. 4, para. 3.
115 The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4/Annex
(Sept. 28, 1984), reprinted in 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1985); e.g., Cho, supra note 11, at
164.
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national security and public safety.""16 Among the principles rel-
evant to the National Security Law are the following:
Principle 29: National security may be invoked to justify
measures limiting certain rights only when they are taken
to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integ-
rity or political independence against force or threat of
force.
Principle 30: National security cannot be invoked as a rea-
son for imposing limitations to prevent merely local or rel-
atively isolated threats to law and order.
Principle 31: National security cannot be used as a pretext
for imposing vague or arbitrary limitations and may only
be invoked when there exists adequate safeguards and ef-
fective remedies against abuse.
Principle 32: The systematic violation of human rights un-
dermines true national security and may jeopardize inter-
national peace and security. A state responsible for such
violation shall not invoke national security as a justification
for measures aimed at suppressing opposition to such vio-
lation or at perpetrating repressive practices against its
population.
Principle 33: Public safety means protection against danger
to the safety of persons, to their life or physical integrity, or
serious damage to their property.
Principle 34: The need to protect public safety can justify
limitations provided by law. It cannot be used for impos-
ing vague or arbitrary limitations and may only be invoked
when there exist adequate safeguards and effective reme-
dies against abuse.
Critics charge the South Korean government with using the
National Security Law to do precisely what the Siracusa Princi-
ples prohibit: touting national security as a pretext for arresting
opponents of the government.
116 Id.
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E. THE JOHANNESBURG PRINCIPLES (1996)
The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom
of Expression and Access to Information ("Johannesburg Princi-
ples") were adopted by experts in international law, national se-
curity, and human rights."' Among the Johannesburg Principles'
stated objectives is the desire
to promote a clear recognition of the limited scope of re-
strictions on freedom of expression and freedom of infor-
mation that may be imposed in the interest of national
security, so as to discourage governments from using the
pretext of national security to place unjustified restrictions
118on the exercise of these freedoms....
1.7 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39, at 28 (Mar. 22, 1996).
118 Id. pmbl. Relevant portions include:
"Everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference." Id. princ.
l(a).
"No restriction on freedom of expression or information on the ground of
national security may be imposed unless the government can demonstrate
that the restriction is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic
society to protect a legitimate national security interest. The burden of
demonstrating the validity of the restriction rests with the government."
Id. princ. 1(d).
"Any restriction on expression or information must be prescribed by law.
The law must be accessible, unambiguous, drawn narrowly and with preci-
sion so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is
unlawful." Id. princ. 1.1(a).
"Any restriction on expression or information that a government seeks to
justify on grounds of national security must have the genuine purpose and
demonstrable effect of protecting a legitimate national security interest."
Id. princ. 1.2.
To establish that a restriction on freedom of expression or information is
necessary to protect a legitimate national security interest, a government
must demonstrate that:
(a) the expression or information at issue poses a serious threat to a legiti-
mate national security interest;
(b) the restriction imposed is the least restrictive means possible for pro-
tecting that interest; and
(c) the restriction is compatible with democratic principles."
Id. princ. 1.3.
A restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not
legitimate unless its genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect
a country's existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of
force, or its capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether from
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F. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TO
SOUTH KOREA
A major criticism of the National Security Law is that it is a
blatant violation of international human rights standards." 9
While human rights norms have been internationalized, 2 ° the ex-
tent and manner in which they are implemented varies.12' The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty and thus
is not binding on United Nations members. 22 The United Na-
tions Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) is the main au-
thority on setting international human rights norms, including
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."2 The UNCHR's
monitoring powers are weak: while it can investigate a country's
alleged human rights violations under the "1503 procedure," the
monitoring is sporadic.2 1 The Human Rights Committee, the
next major international human rights body, reviews reports sub-
mitted by member countries."2 Because countries are inconsis-
tent in the quality and thoroughness of their reports, the ability
an external source, such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as
incitement to violent overthrow of the government."
Id. princ. 2(a).
In particular, a restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national
security is not legitimate if its genuine purpose or demonstrable effect is to
protect interests unrelated to national security, including, for example, to
protect a government from embarrassment or exposure of wrongdoing, or
to conceal information about the functioning of its public institutions, or to
entrench a particular ideology, or to suppress industrial unrest.
Id. princ. 2(b):
"9 E.g., Cho, supra note 11, at 166.
120 By 2001, the six leading international human rights treaties had been signed by an
average of 156 parties. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 38 (2003).
121 Id. at 34.
122 E.g., PHILIP J. ELDRIDGE, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
19 (2002).
123 DONNELLY, supra note 120, at 129.
124 See Coln Campbell & Avril McDonald, Practice to Theory: States of Emergency
and Human Rights Protection in Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES:
CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS IN ASIA
249, 260 (Michael Jacobsen & Ole Bruun eds., 2000).
'25 DONNELLY, supra note 120, at 133.
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of the Human Rights Committee to monitor human rights is
limited.126
In part for these reasons, and because human rights are vio-
lated by states and so are a state matter, some argue that interna-
tional human rights groups can have only a limited impact in
effecting change in countries accused of human rights viola-
tions. 7 While it is true that international human rights groups
can encourage change at the highest level of government as well
as provide international scrutiny of nations that violate human
rights,1" it is national action from the bottom up that will be best
able to improve human rights.2 9 International human rights
groups can best help, some experts argue, by encouraging aware-
ness of human rights issues among local groups. 30
South Korea provides an illustration of both the potential
and limitations of international human rights groups in eliminat-
ing human rights violations in a given country. South Korea has
ratified the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, among other human rights
treaties.' According to the South Korea Constitution, treaties
126 Id. at 134.
127 Id. at 175-76, 179.
128 ELDRIDGE, supra note 122, at 21.
129 DONNELLY, supra note 120, at 179-80.
'3 Shale Horowitz & Albrecht Schnabel, Human Rights and Societies in Transition:
International Context and Sources of Variation, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES
IN TRANSITION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES 3, 5 (Shale Horowitz & Al-
brecht Schnabel eds., 2004).
131 Lee, supra note 112, at 706. South Korea has also ratified the Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Optional Pro-
tocols on the Convention of the Rights of the Child. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bod-
ies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf.
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that are ratified by the government have the same effect as do-
mestic laws; however, if there is a conflict between the two, do-
mestic laws will supersede the treaty.3 2 Thus, the effect of such
treaties can be significantly reduced.'33
In part because of this limitation, international human rights
groups have long called for the abolition of South Korea's Na-
tional Security Law without success. In the late 1990s, NGOs
criticized Kim Dae Jung's government for using the National Se-
curity Law to arrest people who demonstrated during the eco-
nomic crisis." Kim was also criticized for using the law to punish
the filmmaker Suh Joon Sik for showing "Red Hunt," his film
about the suppression of communists on Cheju Island in 1948, at
the Korean Human Rights Film Festival in 1997."1 While arrests
continued under the Kim regime, an unofficial moratorium on
executions that began when Kim was elected president means
that recently no one has been executed for National Security
Law violations.
36
Since Roh Mu Hyun became president in 2003, punishment
for violations of the National Security Law has become less
harsh, although reportedly more than fifty people have been ar-
rested under the law since his inauguration. 7 Not surprisingly,
international human rights groups continue to criticize the law.
In an open letter to the Korean National Assembly, Amnesty In-
ternational denounced the law's "vaguely worded clauses" and
its failure "to meet international standards that require all crimi-
nal offenses to be defined clearly so that people understand what
conduct is prohibited.""18 The group also argued that the law is
132 KOREA CONST. ch. I, art 6(1); Lee, supra note 112, at 713.
133 Lee, supra note 112, at 713.
'3 See NEARY, supra note 1, at 82.
135 Letter from The FilmWatch Comm. to Kim Dae Jung, President of S. Korea (July
16, 1999), available at http:/Ihrw.orglenglishldocs/1999/07/16/usintlO58_txt.htm.
136 E.g., Hum. Rights Watch, Human Rights in South Korea (ROK: The Republic of
Korea) (2004), available at http://hrw.orglenglish/docs/2004/07/08/skorea9047_txt.
htm; Open Letter from Amnesty Int'l, to Newly Elected Members of the 17th
National Assembly, S. Korea (July 2004), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
countries/southkorea/document.do?id=479625376824612880256EBA0052B368.
137 Hum. Rights Watch, supra note 136. Of those arrested, approximately half were
given suspended prison sentences and released. Id.
13 Open Letter from Amnesty Int'l, supra note 136.
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applied arbitrarily, pointing out that "while certain left-wing po-
litical works are permitted for academic study, possession or ref-
erence to the same works often becomes a criminal offense in the
hands of a student or activist with perceived 'pro-North Korea'
leanings." '139
International human rights groups meeting at the Asian-Pa-
cific Forum in Seoul in September 2004 also called for the law's
abolition.'" The forum was followed the next day by the Interna-
tional Conference for National Human Rights Institutions, also
held in Seoul.4 1 The following month Amnesty International
publicly supported the Uri Party's call for the National Security
Law's repeal, and expressed its strong disagreement with the
Constitutional Court's ruling in support of the law.142 In a letter
to the Uri Party, Amnesty International noted the contradiction
between the dictates of the law and the government's "Sunshine
policy," which supports more communication and contact be-
tween North and South Korea.
143
However, not all NGOs believe the National Security Law
should or can be completely abolished. One foreign NGO ob-
server, attending the September 2004 International Conference
for National Human Rights Institutions in Seoul, reportedly said
that Asian countries need such security laws." Indeed, most
constitutions provide for using emergency measures when na-
tional security is threatened, even if the government must sus-
pend constitutional rights . 45 To what extent, then, are national
security concerns a valid reason to retain security laws that vio-
late international human rights standards? While realpolitik ad-
vocates often view compliance with human rights standards as
little more than a noble goal, those who otherwise view human
139 Id.
'40 Chung, supra note 94.
141 Id.
142 Park, supra note 67.
143 Id.
144 Chung, supra note 94.
141 Campbell & McDonald, supra note 124, at 250.
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rights as more than aspirational are sometimes willing to compro-
mise them in the interests of national security.'46 Article 4 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for exam-
ple, countenances the suspension of certain human rights during
national emergencies. 147 Even Asia Watch recognized South Ko-
rea's concern with security as "understandable and legitimate"
given the North Korean threat." Others argue, however, that
even if legitimate national security concerns justify national se-
curity laws, the security threat does not justify the abuse of those
laws. 49
In the 1990s, much of the debate about human rights abuses
in Asia centered on the idea of "Asian values."1 0 Briefly, Asian-
values proponents argue that human rights are culturally specific,
and that Asians value duty to the community over individual
rights, and social and economic rights over civil and political
rights.' One survey showed, for example, that Asians valued
group harmony and an orderly society more highly than did
'46 See, e.g., Daniel Rothenberg, Commentary, "What We Have Seen has been Terri-
ble:" Public Presentational Torture and the Communicative Logic of State Terror,
67 ALB. L. REV. 465, 466-67 (2003); DONNELLY, supra note 120, at 162 (recogniz-
ing that "unless we implausibly assume that international human rights take pri-
ority over all other national interests, human rights must sometimes be sacrificed
to other interests and values.").
... International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 112, art. 4; EL-
DRIDGE, supra note 122, at 20.
148 ASIA WATCH ET AL., supra note 43, at 29-30.
149 Lee, supra note 112, at 715 (arguing that the North Korean threat "has been an
ideological pretext used to oppress individuals and to maintain the masked legiti-
macy of dictatorship").
150 See generally Campbell & McDonald, supra note 124; DONNELLY, supra note 120.
151 See Ole Bruun & Michael Jacobsen, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN
VALUES: CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL REPRESENTA-
TIONS IN ASIA, supra note 124, at 1, 3. "Asian values" have been traced to Con-
fucianism, which emphasizes hierarchy and obedience. In South Korea, for
example, Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan "utilized Confucianism to rein-
force their authority, emphasizing loyalty and obedience to the state and to jus-
tify measures taken to halt opposition to their rule." Terence Roehrig, Human
Rights, the Military, and the Transition to Democracy in Argentina and South Ko-
rea, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
RESPONSES, supra note 130, at 389, 402.
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Americans. 5 ' Similarly, compared with Americans, most Sin-
gaporeans value public safety more highly than civil liberties.'53
The suggestion follows that while citizens of Western countries
may not be willing to endure harsh security measures in the
name of national security, citizens of Asian countries will, and
moreover, their choice should be respected by the international
community.
The Bangkok Declaration serves as an example of the con-
flict.'54 While the Bangkok Declaration expresses Asians' sup-
port of universal human rights, it also states that human rights
should be viewed in the context of each nation's historical, cul-
tural, and religious background.'55 Further, it emphasizes that all
countries have the right to choose their political systems, and
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.'56 Some
argue that by including such reservations, the Bangkok Declara-
tion has detracted from the universality of human rights.'57 The
problem, according to Asian-values critics, is that given the free-
dom to do so in the name of national culture and development,
many countries will use states of emergency to abuse national
security laws, for example by silencing political opponents in the
name of national security.' 8
152 Joseph Chan, Thick and Thin Accounts of Human Rights: Lessons from the Asian
Values Debate, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES: CONTESTING NATIONAL
IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS IN ASIA, supra note 124, at 59, 69.
153 ELDRIDGE, supra note 122, at 35.
"4 Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, Mar. 29-
Apr. 2, 1993, Final Declaration, U.N. Doc AICONF.157/ASRM/8, A/CONF.157/
PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993).
155 Id. art. 8; Chan, supra note 152, at 59-60.
I56 Hugo Stokke, Modernization without Westernization?: Asian Values and Human
Rights Discourse in East and West, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES: CON-
TESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS IN ASIA,
supra note 124, at 134, 135.
157 Id.
5 See Campbell & McDonald, supra note 124; Horowitz & Schnabel, supra note
130; See also Amartya Sen for the thesis that the Asian values argument is used
to justify authoritarian government. Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Val-
ues: What Lee Kuan Yew and Le Peng Don't Understand About Asia, NEW RE-
PUBLIC, July 14, 1997, at 33.
South Korea's National Security Law
VI. A COMPARISON TO SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA
To understand South Korea's position in the use of its Na-
tional Security Law to suppress dissent in the name of national
security, it is worth considering other democratic or "semi-demo-
cratic" Asian countries that have similar laws and how they have
used those laws. To that end, this Comment briefly discusses the
national security laws of Singapore and Malaysia. While it ap-
pears that fewer people are held under the security laws of Singa-
pore and Malaysia than are held in South Korea under the
National Security Law, the laws are similarly broad and arbitrar-
ily applied, and with the potential for an equally widespread re-
striction of civil and political rights.
I59
A. SINGAPORE
As a small island nation comprised of three major ethnic
groups that have occasionally clashed,"6 Singapore arguably has
legitimate security concerns. 6' Singapore's national security leg-
islation includes the Internal Security Act.'62 Like the National
Security Law, the Internal Security Act was intended to thwart
communist insurgents but has been used to silence critics of the
government, and more recently, radical Muslims. 6' Under the
Internal Security Act, offenders can be held for up to two years,
with right to counsel but no right to challenge the substance of
the detention. 6" People detained under the Internal Security Act
face restrictions in their freedom of movement.' The media is
159 A HISTORY OF SINGAPORE 175, 177-78 (Ernest C.T. Chew & Edwin Lee eds.,
1991); JIM BAKER, CROSSROADS: A POPULAR HISTORY OF MALAYSIA & SINGA-
PORE 279, 283-84, 304, 307-08 (1999). Cf. ELDRIDGE, supra note 122, at 93.
160 Singapore's population is approximately seventeen percent Chinese, fourteen
percent Malay, and eight percent Indian. U.S. State Dep't, Bureau of East Asian
& Pac. Aff., Background Note: Singapore, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.
htm.
161 ELDRIDGE, supra note 122, at 45.
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controlled by the government, as is public protest."6 Groups of
more than five people need permission from the police to assem-
ble, and speakers need permission before speaking in public.'67
Foreign publications are licensed and are prohibited from dis-
cussing domestic politics."6 The government justified such re-
strictions under the notions of Asian values and economic
prosperity. Former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was
one of Asia's most vocal proponents of "Asian values," 69 arguing
that "[i]n the East the main object is to have a well ordered soci-
ety so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his free-
doms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in
a natural state of contention and anarchy."'7 His critics argue
that he used "Asian values" and the Internal Security Act to
deny Singaporeans their civil and political rights, for example the
right to criticize elected officials. 7' The opposition leader Chee
Soon Juan, for example, was banned from parliament when he
challenged the lack of openness in the Singapore government.
Nonetheless, others assert that Singaporeans have been willing to




The situation in Malaysia is similar to that of Singapore. Al-
though not a small island, Malaysia resembles Singapore in that
it is comprised of an ethnically diverse population.'74 Malaysia,
'6 ELDRIDGE, supra note 122, at 46.
167 Stokke, supra note 156, at 149.
168 Id.
169 Randall Peerenboom, Varities of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional
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supra note 124, at 178, 182 (quoting from Culture is Destiny, an Interview with
Fareed Zakaria, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 109 (1994)).
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too, has an Internal Security Act, enacted in 1960.75 Like the
Singapore law, the Malaysian Internal Security Act allows viola-
tors to be detained for up to two years, but this sentence can be
renewed. 76 The Malaysian Internal Security Act goes further in
that suspected security threats can be held for up to sixty days
without a warrant. 77 In addition, there is no judicial review of
cases brought under the Internal Security Act. 78 Those who
have been detained under the Act are subject to restrictions of
movement until their rehabilitation period has been completed. 79
The most well-known prisoner in recent years is former Deputy
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who in 1998 led a demonstration
demanding reform, including the resignation of Prime Minister
Mahathir." Ibrahim was arrested under the Internal Security
Act, charged with sodomy and conspiracy, and convicted in seri-
ously flawed trials. 8 ' Ibrahim's wife was restricted under the In-
ternal Security Act from holding meetings in her home and from
appearing at public gatherings.'82
As in Singapore, the government presents restrictions on
civil and political rights as "the price to be paid" for social and
economic prosperity.'83 Until he voluntarily left office in 2003,
Prime Minister Mahathir was re-elected by Malaysian citizens
many times, suggesting that in Malaysia, too, the citizens appear
to be willing to support these government leaders and pay the
price of restricted rights."u However, as in South Korea, opposi-
tion and human rights groups have called for the abolition of Ma-
laysia's Internal Security Act.'85 There are several NGOs in
H.P. Lee, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in Malaysia, in ASIAN Dis-
COURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 163, at 225, 240 (2004).
176 Id.
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178 Id.
"9 Stokke, supra note 156, at 150.
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181 Id. In September 2004, Malaysia's Federal Court overturned Ibrahim's conviction
and freed him. U.S. State Dep't, supra note 174.
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... Lee, supra note 175, at 244.
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Malaysia whose goals include the abolition of the Internal Secur-
ity Act.'86 In addition, the Malaysian Charter on Human Rights
was adopted in 1994,187 and the government established the
Human Rights Commission of Malaysia in 1999."8 While the
commission has been criticized as a "tokenistic attempt to im-
prove Malaysia's tarnished image," others are hopeful that it is a
step toward greater respect for human rights.8 9 Unlike South
Korea, neither Malaysia nor Singapore has ratified the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."9
VII. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW
Singapore and Malaysia differ from South Korea in several
ways, perhaps most importantly in that they are not democracies
to the same extent as South Korea. In Malaysia, the prime minis-
ter holds almost all power, and in Singapore there is no real po-
litical opposition.'91 Furthermore, as countries transition from
authoritarian to democratic rule, they may be more economically
and politically dependent on foreign countries, thus making them
more susceptible to demands for increased attention to human
rights."9 Repeal of the National Security Law and an improve-
ment in the human rights situation might therefore seem more
likely in South Korea,193 especially given the Uri Party's recent
pledges to at least amend the law.
"6 Id. at 97. These NGOs include the Voice of Malaysia, the National Association
for Human Rights, the Malaysian Bar Council, the Movement in Defense of Ma-
laysian Islam, and the Centre for Peace.
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On the other hand, the North Korean security threat seems
more imminent than any threats to Singapore or Malaysia, espe-
cially given the announcement in 2005 by North Korean leader
Kim Jong I1 that North Korea has nuclear weapons.1" This reve-
lation, however unsurprising, could dampen efforts to amend or
repeal the National Security Law. On the positive side for Singa-
pore and Malaysia, ASEAN 95 nations have started to show
greater interest in United Nations human rights regimes." How-
ever, this increased recognition is not always accompanied by
greater adherence to the requirements of United Nations human
rights treaties.1" In addition, Asia has lagged behind Europe, the
Americas, and Africa in establishing regional human rights
regimes. 9s
An additional factor that is likely to affect the human rights
situation in all three countries is globalization, which, in addition
to expanding markets worldwide, has started to propagate inter-
national human rights norms throughout the world.' The econ-
omies of these countries have grown tremendously in the last
several decades, with greater opportunities to improve the living
and educational standards of its people. These opportunities in
turn can result in greater awareness of human rights violations
and demands for adherence to international human rights
" James Brooke & David E. Sanger, North Korea Says They Hold Nuclear Arms,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A5.
195 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN was established in 1967 by In-
donesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to promote economic
growth, social progress, cultural development, and stability in Southeast Asia.
ASEAN homepage, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm.
'96 ELDRIDGE, supra note 122, at 2.
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'98 Campbell & McDonald, supra note 124, at 268 (discussing, for example, the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human
Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights).
'9' See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 429, 491 (1997).
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norms." Simply put, as people improve their economic situa-
tion, demands for imported goods increases, which in turn in-
creases contacts between countries.2"' Furthermore, countries
that wish to play a more important role in the global economy
may be forced to pay more attention to their human rights re-
cord; they could be politically and economically shunned if the
world community perceives them as persistent human rights
violators."
Finally, if South Korea's main justification for retaining the
National Security Law is the North Korean threat, the recent de-
velopment of economic links between North and South may
make at least part of the law obsolete. A "special economic
zone" inside North Korea hosts South Korean companies that
make semi-conductors and kitchenware, with more companies
expected to start operations in the near future.2 3 If Article 5 of
the National Security Law prohibits aiding or accepting valuables
from anti-state groups, buying cooking pots and semi-conductors
made by North Koreans would seem to be of questionable legal-
ity.2 ' Furthermore, prohibitions on South Koreans traveling to
North Korea will have to be eased for the South Korean employ-
ees of the "special economic zone" companies. Finally, the in-
creased economic ties between North and South Korea may
change South Koreans' attitudes toward the North. One South
Korean project manager said that after several visits to North
200 See Horowitz & Schnabel, supra note 130, at 11-14.
2'0 Id. at 14 (arguing that "[i]nternational economic integration probably has a more
significant impact on human rights norms simply by increasing personal and cul-
tural interaction with the rest of the world."); see also Bruun & Jacobsen, supra
note 151, at 11 ("Globalization provides the arena for cross-cultural conversation,
for instance by submitting human rights to a continued scrutiny of 'public reason'
around the world.").
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Korea, his opinions about the country started to change for the
better, after a lifetime of being told that North Koreans were the
enemy.'0 5 If economic ties between South and North Korea con-
tinue to expand, and if attitudes towards North Korea continue
to soften as a result of economic expansion, the National Security
Law is perhaps destined to become an anachronism, even if it is
never repealed.
2
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